Since the Israeli occupation of the rest of the Palestinian Territories (1967), the city of Jerusalem has continued to enjoy a privileged position in the perceptions and interests of the Palestinians, and their national movement, as a historical, religious and national symbol, at the same time, and this has been expressed in all official documents issued by the Liberation Organization, factions and Palestinian association bodies, including the “declaration of independence”, in which the Palestinian National Council declared “the establishment of the state of Palestine... with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital."(Session 19, Algeria, November 1988).

Political developments
It is obvious that dealing with this issue has been evolving, in various respects, according to the developments of the Palestinian issue, and it has also continued to complicate with its complexity, whether it concerns conflict issues, i.e. resistance to occupation policies, settlement, land confiscation, attempts at Judaization and displacement, or related to the settlement process and available options.

It may be useful to recall here that when the Palestinian national movement was putting forward its liberation program, there was no special issue for Jerusalem, or for any other issue, as the concept of liberation included the restoration of Jerusalem (eastern and western) and the return of refugees. It means that the issue of Jerusalem was distinguished after the transition from the liberation program to the settlement program, or the two-state solution, and on the basis of ending Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and considering east Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state.

In this context, the Palestinian approach to the issue of Jerusalem included three issues: the first, related to the consideration of Jerusalem as a holy city where the Al-Aqsa Mosque is located, the first two tribes and the third of the two sanctuaries, and as a holy city for all the heavenly religions. The second relates to the national - political dimension, as the conflict intensifies in this city, which Israel considers its capital, especially with its attempts to change its demographic character, change its features, and strengthen settlement in it. The third is the human rights aspect related to the disclosure of Israel's policies and resistance, regarding its tireless efforts to restrict the Palestinians of Jerusalem, to displace them from it, to control their homes and lands, and to adopt a policy of house demolition.

However, the disadvantages of these policies, despite their importance, are that the Palestinians have not been able to build a network of civil institutions that can contribute to repelling Israeli policies and strengthening the steadfastness of Palestinians in Jerusalem, in the best way, due to the predominance of spontaneous, temperamental, individual and opportunistic character, which has characterized the Palestinian national movement, since its inception, which negatively affected the ability of Palestinians to unite, employ their capabilities and invest their struggles and sacrifices, and this applies to the issue of Jerusalem as well.

The highest manifestations of the Palestinian struggle for Jerusalem were manifested in the first intifada (1987-1993), as it became the de facto capital of the Palestinians and the leading center of their uprising, especially with the presence of the official leadership abroad (at that time), and with the emergence of credible Jerusalemite figures, headed by the late Faisal Husseini.

During that period, two centers emerged that played a major role in the Intifada, the first was the Al-Aqsa Mosque, where Friday prayers, in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were gathering, became one of the most important manifestations of the intifada and the Palestinians ' rejection of the occupation and incitement to resistance. The second, the "Orient House", which served as a guiding Center for the intifada, and as an expression of the Palestinians in the occupied territory, as it became a headquarters visited by foreign ministers, ambassadors, consuls and media correspondents.

It is worth mentioning here that this status for Jerusalem, and for the Jerusalem leadership, appeared thanks to the intifada of the Palestinians in the occupied territory, and without interference from the official leadership, recalling that the “gift of the tunnel” (1996) occurred due to Israel conducting excavations under the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and that the Second Intifada (2000-2004) broke out after Ariel Sharon violated the sanctity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque (late September 2000). The difference can be seen in the declining role of Jerusalem, after the Israeli measures, which included restricting the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank to it, the closure of Orient House (2001), the closure of many offices of Palestinian associations or preventing them from working, and the construction of a separation wall, after the wave of bombings, especially the operation carried out by the “Izz al-Din al-Qassam” Brigades in Sparrow Restaurant (August 2001), in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem in the negotiating process
After the Palestinian leadership accorded Jerusalem a special and central place in its theses related to the settlement, especially considering it as the capital of the future state of Palestine, then it agreed in the Oslo agreement, as a result of Israeli and international pressure, to postpone the decision on the fate of this city, with an important note that this matter concerned what became known as East Jerusalem, that is, the part of the city occupied by Israel in 1967, that is, the matter did not include the rest of Jerusalem (West), although this was available or legitimate, even as a matter of political pressure, based on the reference of the partition decision (based on the reference of the partition decision), even though it was available or legitimate, even as a result of political pressure, based on the reference of the partition decision (the decision to transfer the city to the West) 181 of 1947), knowing that the Palestinian leadership was distancing itself from this decision or She did not hire him as part of her efforts to establish the supposed Palestinian state.

It may be useful to recall here that Dr. Haider Abdel Shafi, the head of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid negotiations (as part of the Jordanian-Palestinian joint delegation) stressed the importance of Jerusalem's place for the Palestinians in any settlement, as stated in the opening session: “Jerusalem is not only the soul of Palestine, but the cradle of the three World Religions, its alleged absence is tangible among us at this stage, its apparent exclusion from this conference is a denial of its right to strive for peace. Jerusalem has prevented the city of peace from attending the peace conference... Palestinian Jerusalem is the capital of our homeland and our independent state, which determines the Palestinian existence past, present and future, deprived of its voice and identity, Jerusalem challenges the uniqueness of its ownership... Israel's annexation of Jerusalem remains illegal in the eyes of the international community, and even constitutes an insult to the peace that this city deserves,”he said.

Thus, the Palestinian negotiator, both in bilateral and multilateral talks, has been insisting on opening the file on the future of Jerusalem and on the right of the Palestinians to form their delegation from within, from the diaspora and from Jerusalem as well. In this context, the Palestinian delegation was invited to the meetings of the steering committee (for multilateral negotiations) held in London (3-4/12/1992 the need to establish two working groups within the framework of these negotiations, one on Jerusalem (the second on human rights), and the Arab and European countries supported this demand, but because of the Israeli rejection of it and the American support for this position, the decision on this issue was postponed, and then rejected.

However, the Palestinian leadership, in the context of its struggle for its position after the International and regional changes, at the beginning of the nineties, including the marginalization of its position in the Madrid negotiations (1991), removed the previous considerations, by holding the Oslo agreement (1993).

Here two points stand out on the Palestinian position:
The first note is that in concluding the above-mentioned agreement, the Palestinian leadership has practically retreated on basic issues from the positions it used to declare in its documents and speeches of its leaders, as it agreed to postpone the decision on the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, borders and settlements, to the so-called Final Solution negotiations (with the issue of security arrangements), in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian entity in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, betting on the possibility of developing this formula into an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, knowing that this is not according to the equations of the balance of power, but according to the equations of negotiation, and in a situation in which Israel owns resolution, the ability to control.

Another aspect that should be noted here is that the matter did not stop at postponing the decision on the issue of Jerusalem, only, as the failure to decide on the issues of borders and settlements, Israel launched its hand in promoting settlement activities in Jerusalem and its surroundings, indifferent to the Oslo agreement, by virtue of pursuing a fait accompli policy, and with its declaration that Jerusalem is a red line, as it has its own eternal unified capital, justifying this by the fact that the Oslo agreement placed the issue of Jerusalem in the framework of negotiations, that is, to discuss appropriate solutions to it, by agreement of the parties, knowing that Israel was explicitly declaring its refusal to cede the unity of Jerusalem under its sovereignty, knowing that Israel was explicitly declaring its refusal to cede the unity of Jerusalem under its sovereignty, knowing that and its refusal to withdraw to the borders of the Fourth of June, including East Jerusalem. And all these things were also revealed in the Camp David negotiations ٢ (٢٠٠٠).

Today we know the meaning of this strange formula, which was accepted by the Palestinian negotiator in Oslo, and put us in front of this catastrophe, where today the settlements have multiplied several times in Jerusalem and in the West Bank.

Priority of the authority entity
The orientations of the Palestinian leadership, i.e. the leadership of the organization, the PA and Fatah, did not differ after the establishment of the PA entity, as the issue of Jerusalem continued to be a priority in the programs, statements and speeches of Palestinian leaders, but it also continued to lack organized and sustainable institutional work.

Thus, the second observation that should be realized here is that when the PA was occupied, it was the center of attention of the Palestinian leadership, at the expense of attention to other issues, such as Jerusalem and refugees, for example, and attention to the issue of developing and activating the Liberation Organization and various national entities; that is, the Palestinian leadership became preoccupied above all with itself, i.e. with the authority. Moreover, the new entity has become the reference, not the PLO, that is, on the contrary, the organization has become dependent on the support of the authority for its resources.

In any case, the dependence of Palestinian entities on external resources has, in what has led to it, weakened or reduced the fighting energies of Palestinians in the West Bank, especially in Jerusalem, especially after the negative repercussions resulting from the end of the Second Intifada and the departure of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, as the Palestinians ' choice has become limited to negotiations and settlement, and gaining the confidence of the parties concerned (especially the United States and Israel), without adopting alternative or even parallel options, and the talk here is about strengthening the civil, popular and peaceful struggle, establishing institutions of merit and responsibility, and providing appropriate support to enable the Palestinians to steadfastness in Jerusalem, not about anything else, neither war nor Armed struggle.

Our proof of this is that when the Palestinian leadership decided, for example, to resume negotiations (2013), it did not stipulate the opening of East Jerusalem institutions, including Orient House, as it stipulated the release of old detainees.

The other thing that should be mentioned here is its acceptance that the custodianship of the holy places should remain in the hands of others, and its renunciation of its right to responsibility for them, which is a remarkable precedent that means that by accepting the Palestinian leadership, the PLO will retreat from its status as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, a status that it won thanks to the sacrifices and struggles of others.

At the end of this paper, I would like to draw attention to two issues: the first is that it warns against dealing with Jerusalem, or discriminating its status, on the basis of religion, because religious narratives are common, and do not establish rights, in international standards, that is, Jerusalem should be treated as a national issue, as part of the political conflict, like any other city, while

The second, which comes from the PA's weak interest in Jerusalem, States the need to strengthen the efforts of the Palestinians, in all places where they are, to support the steadfastness of the Palestinians of Jerusalem, in all forms, because this is the real and practical response to Israel's attempts to Judaize Jerusalem.